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Abstract 
Public transportation delays due to systematic failures have a major impact on network users. We 
propose designing capacity pooling contracts to facilitate horizontal cooperation among operators 
to mitigate those costs and improve service resilience. When two or more public transport 
providers agree upon sharing resources, the total transportation costs can be reduced due to added 
flexibility in the system. These operators may contribute capacity to be used in cost-effective 
routes owned by other operators. We formulate a two-stage stochastic model to determine the cost 
savings under different collaboration scenarios. We provide several solution methods: a 
deterministic equivalent problem, the L-shaped method, and sample average approximation. 
Coalitional stability under Shapley value, nucleolus, and 𝜏-value are tested. The proposed model 
is applied to a regional multimodal network in the Randstad area of the Netherlands, for four 
operators, 80 origin-destination pairs, and over 1400 links where disruption data is available. Using 
the proposed method, we identify stable cost allocations among four operating agencies that could 
yield a 44% improvement in overall network performance over not having any risk pooling 
contract in place.  
Keywords: Two stage-stochastic programming, network disruptions, cost allocation 
mechanisms, horizontal collaboration, multicommodity flow problem 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Mobility services face the uncertainty of disruptions that can cause significant costs and delays. 
These disruptions are caused by non-recurrent events (natural or man-made) that reduce 
transportation supply and can cause breakdown conditions on other parts of the network. In large 
multimodal urban networks, the lack of coordination can lead to significant financial risks and 
needs to be addressed beforehand to mitigate them. For example, Hurricane Sandy caused $400 
million to the U.S. public transit system (Levin, 2012) in which 25% of the total cost was from 
capital expenses.  
These disruption costs may be mitigated with capacity available from other parts of the system 
(Pender et al., 2013), or from other operators in a multimodal environment or Mobility-as-a-
Service (MaaS) platform. Examples include redirecting buses from one line to serve a degraded 
line (e.g. bus bridging and shuttle planning: Hu et al., 2016; Jin et al., 2016, Van der Hurk et al., 
2016; Zhang and Lo, 2020), or for Mobility-on-Demand fleets to provide coverage during 
disrupted service (e.g. Tyndall, 209; Fang et al., 2020). In this manner, risks of service degradation 
due to disruptions are reduced by having multiple operators pool their resources together. As multi-
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modal travel becomes essential in large megacities, the benefits of resource consolidation can 
provide a much better service with fewer delays and disruptions. Such a multi-modal system 
requires operators to agree to a contract in advance, which offers a new design problem for 
mobility operators (Hensher, 2017). 
The research question that follows is how to design such a contract between mobility operators 
such that they are incentivized to commit a required amount of capacity? Without pre-disruption 
agreements, mobility operators may choose not to share resources post-disaster or, worse still, may 
even leverage the tragedy to gain further profits (Hawkins, 2018). We propose a resource-sharing 
insurance contract mechanism designed to pool the resources of transportation operators (public 
transit operators, shared-use mobility providers, taxi companies, etc.) to hedge against disruptions.  
The novel problem addressed in this study is distinctive in that the value of a coalition of 
mobility operators serving in a capacitated multicommodity flow network is determined by a two-
stage stochastic program, which has not been studied before. In the first stage, the model 
determines the optimal amount of resources that each operator needs to contribute to a pool such 
that the second stage disruption scenarios allow disrupted operators to draw from that pool. These 
contributions are measured in capacity units (either relocating vehicles to other links or providing 
part of their infrastructure to accommodate multimodal trips). The model is coupled with different 
alternative cost allocation mechanisms to identify conditions needed to ensure stability of the 
contract. We propose solution algorithms using L-shaped method common to stochastic 
programming and sample average approximation method (SAA) to reach satisfying solutions.  
Computational tests are conducted with the model and algorithms in different-sized instances. 
For the larger network instance, we evaluate a four-agency insurance contract for the urban 
multimodal network in the southern ring (Zuidvleugel) of the Randstad area in Netherlands where 
real disruption data is available. The multimodal case study network offers an interesting case 
because it includes multiple operating agencies that operate different fleet types and the results 
provide a characterization of their bargaining power in setting up the contract.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature 
on two-stage stochastic network problems and game-theoretic profit allocation methods. Section 
3 describes the formulation of the two-stage stochastic programming model and solution 
algorithms. In Section 4, we provide illustrative examples and discuss potential shortcomings of 
simple allocation mechanisms to further show how cost allocation mechanisms impact the design. 
We also provide a computational evaluation of the proposed solution methods. Section 5 
demonstrates the use of our contract design model in a real case study using data from the 
multimodal Randstad Zuidvleugel network. Section 6 discusses the key findings and offers 
concluding remarks and potential future research directions.  
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Capacity planning is critical for the robustness of transportation networks that face major 
disruptions (Chen et al., 1999; Cats and Jenelius, 2015). Disaster mitigation against these 
disruptions has been studied extensively in the context of pre-disaster relief planning. Solution 
strategies include retrofitting or allocating reserve capacity in anticipation of disruptions 
(Miandoabchi and Farahani, 2011; Wang et al., 2015). The multicommodity flow problem was 
first used in Haghani and Oh (1996) to model disaster relief planning as a large-scale deterministic 
time-space network. The two-stage stochastic programming approach has been used extensively 
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in pre-disaster relief network planning (Barbarosoǧlu and Arda, 2004; Liu et al., 2009; Rawls and 
Turnquist, 2010; Peeta et al., 2010; Noyan, 2012; Hong et al., 2015; Klibi et al., 2018; Elçi and 
Noyan, 2018). A more comprehensive account of two-stage stochastic problems in disaster relief 
network planning can be found in Grass and Fischer (2016). Common solution methods used in 
these problems include the L-shaped method for two-stage stochastic programming (e.g. Liu et al., 
2009; Rawls and Turnquist, 2010; Miller-Hooks et al., 2012) as well as Monte Carlo-based sample 
average approximation of the disruption scenarios (e.g. Chen and Yang, 2004; Peeta et al., 2010; 
Miller-Hooks et al., 2012; Chow and Regan, 2014). 
 The underlying problem in those studies assumes a single centralized decision-maker. On the 
contrary, many systems are operated by multiple co-existing operators (Chow and Sayarshad, 
2014) in which a centralized operation cannot be assumed, particularly in multimodal networks 
(see Rasulkhani and Chow, 2019) or MaaS platforms (see Pantelidis et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2019). 
There are studies looking at cascading failures in interdependent systems to measure the effects of 
one system on another (e.g. traffic-electric interactions: Fotouhi et al., 2017). However, there are 
no studies that deal with design of incentives for multiple transport operators to collaborate in 
anticipation of disruptions. Game-theoretic models have been used in disaster planning, although 
the players other than the network decision-maker involve either an attacker (Jin et al., 2015) or 
an “evil entity” that represents worst case disasters (Bell et al., 2008), leading to a class of network 
retrofit models called fortification problems under interdiction (e.g. Church and Scaparra, 2007) 
or network fortification games (Smith and Lim, 2008). We need cooperative game methods that 
deal with coalition formation as part of horizontal collaboration (see Doukidis et al., 2007) between 
multiple operators.  
 To establish a successful mechanism, the joint benefits of collaborating among the members 
of the collaboration should be distributed in a stable manner (Özener and Ergun, 2008). There are 
several approaches in the literature to ensure stability of horizontal collaborations. Determining 
the allocations obtained for participating in a resource pooling contract is just as important as the 
cost savings estimation model itself. Depending on the value of these allocations, operators may 
be incentivized to participate in a risk-pooling contract or choose to abstain. Different allocation 
rules may result in different payoffs for cooperating operators. Myerson (1980) defines these 
allocation rules as follows: 
 
Definition 1. An allocation rule is a function 𝑋: 𝑆 → ℝ|𝐹| mapping each coalition structure 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 
where  𝑆 is the set of all possible coalitions, onto a payoff allocation: 
𝑋(𝑠) = (𝑋1(𝑠), 𝑋2(𝑠), … , 𝑋|𝐹|(𝑠)). 𝑋𝑓(𝑠) is the payoff allocated to operator 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, under the 
coalitional structure 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.  𝑉(𝑠) is the characteristic function payoff.  
 
In the equal-gains allocation scheme, we aim to provide the same satisfaction level to all 
operators. In the proportional method, the satisfaction of operators is proportional to their pool 
contribution. The total savings 𝐶𝑆(𝑠) are the same as before. The core (Gilles, 1953) is a cost 
allocation concept that ensures no player in a coalition would break away. For example, any game 
that is convex has a non-empty core and therefore a stable allocation solution. The unique stable 
set of the convex game coincides with the core. Another mechanism is the Shapley value (Shapley, 
1951). The Shapley value is a merit-based allocation mechanism that determines the value of each 
players contribution to the coalition. It expresses the core center of gravity in convex games. Other 
mechanisms include the 𝜏-value proposed by Tijs and Driessen (1986), and the nucleolus 
Schmeidler (1969). The equal satisfaction allocation, which is non-CGT, may not always belong 
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within the core. Only cooperative game-theoretic methods will always belong in the core (when it 
is non-empty) and consequently guarantee stability and fairness of a coalition. In general, 
transportation games are superadditive but not convex (Tuljak-Suban, 2018).  
The simple cost allocation mechanisms (equal, proportional, etc.) have been used in the 
literature, as summarized in Kolker (2017). Overall, these types of simple allocation rules do not 
guarantee a fair and equitable distribution of the attained benefits of the collaboration (Cruijssen 
et al., 2007; D’Amours and Rönnqvist, 2010). For example, Schotanus et al. (2008) illustrate how 
the Equal Price method may lead to unfair allocations for larger purchasing organizations. Also, 
proportional allocation schemes may be easy to implement but they are not considered stable 
(Özener and Ergun, 2008). Cost allocations based on a core are used as side payments in Agarwal 
and Ergun (2008) to incentivize cargo ship operators to consolidate their capacities to transfer 
goods more efficiently. Özener and Ergun (2008) proposed several cost-allocation schemes related 
to the core that were also applied to shipping collaborations. 
The Shapley value has been considered as a  payoff allocation mechanism in resource pooling 
contracts (Reinhardt and Dada, 2005). Lozano et al. (2013) use a minimum flow problem to 
estimate cost savings for every sub-coalition of operators. These savings are allocated using such 
allocation methods as Shapley value, nucleolus and 𝜏-value. Kellner and Otto (2012) also use a 
similar approach in allocating 𝐶𝑂2 emissions of different shipments in a road transport route.  
None of the cooperative game theoretic approaches have considered multimodal urban 
transportation systems under a two-stage stochastic programming setting.  
 Our contract design approach uses a multicommodity flow problem to model costs in the 
transportation system for a given coalition and allocates capacities based on savings achieved from 
horizontal cooperation between operators (capacity pooling). It shares some commonalities with 
Lozano et al. (2013). In that study a core transportation model is solved multiple times to obtain 
the potential cost savings solution for every sub-coalition of operators. Finally, these savings are 
allocated using cooperative game theoretic (CGT) allocation methods such as Shapley value, 
nucleolus and  𝜏- value. A key difference between the two studies is that Lozano et al. (2013) is a 
purely deterministic model. We use a two-stage stochastic model that captures the stochasticity of 
capacities that are subject to disruptions.  
 
 
3. Proposed methodology 
 
3.1 Problem statement 
A group of operators 𝐹 own and operate links 𝐴𝑓, 𝐴 = ⋃ 𝐴𝑓𝑓∈𝐹 , in a network 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐴) that 
serve passengers corresponding to a set of origin-destination (OD) pairs 𝑆. The links have 
capacities that are transferable, e.g. service lines with vehicle frequencies that may be reassigned 
to serve another line. This may also represent shared mobility services in which an effective 
capacity can be assigned to an OD pair (e.g. a carshare network can be modeled as a complete 
graph from which steady state capacities can be obtained for each OD pair). The network is subject 
to disruption scenarios 𝜔 ∈ 𝐼 where one or more links are disrupted, i.e. their capacities are 
dropped to zero. The model can be trivially extended to consider intermediate capacity 
degradations instead (see Chow and Regan, 2014).   
The contract design problem for capacity sharing is to determine the amount of capacity 𝑏𝑓 
that each operator 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 is willing to contribute to a pool. A contribution of 𝑏𝑓 = 0 implies the 
operator 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 does not participate in the pool. In the event of a disruption, an impacted operator 
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𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 can freely borrow capacity 𝑒𝑎
𝑓
 to link 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓. The borrowed capacity comes from capacities 
𝑔𝑎 at links 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓′ operated by other operators 𝑓
′ ∈ 𝐹\𝑓. The capacity sharing agreement assumes 
that the savings from the capacity sharing agreement is transferable to the coalition members. In 
that case, stability of a capacity sharing agreement is determined using one of three alternative 
cost-sharing mechanisms: Shapley value, nucleolus, and 𝜏-value. An empty set implies an unstable 
contract for that coalition under that mechanism. 
 
3.2 Proposed two-stage stochastic program formulation 
The capacity pooling problem is defined as a two-stage stochastic linear problem with fixed 
resources. The goal is to minimize the expected total flow costs given a disruption scenario 𝜔 ∈
 𝐼, which can indicate the failure of multiple links (and model correlated network disruptions: see 
Lo and Tung, 2003; Sumalee and Watling, 2008; Chow and Regan, 2014).  
The stochastic program is divided into two stages. The first stage decision variables 𝑏𝑇 =
(𝑏1, 𝑏2, . . , 𝑏|𝐹|) denote the resource contributions to the pool by each operator 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 and are made 
prior to knowing the outcome of the random disruption scenario. The second stage variables are 
made after a random event is realized: flows 𝑥𝑎
𝑠  on links 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 for OD 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, capacity 
contributions 𝑔𝑎, 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓, made by operator 𝑓, and excess capacity 𝑒𝑎′ , 𝑎
′ ∈ 𝐴𝑓′ , borrowed by 
operator 𝑓′ for link 𝑎′. The available capacity is bounded by the first stage decisions.  
 
Notation 
Parameters 
𝐼: finite probability space of disruption scenarios 
𝐾: set of discrete scenarios representing disruption space 𝐼 
𝐹: set of operators 
𝐺(𝑁, 𝐴): network 𝐺 of nodes 𝑁 and links 𝐴 which can be separated into disjoint sets 
𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 
𝑆: set of OD pairs 
𝜉(𝜔) ∈ ℤ2
|𝐴|: indicator (0,1) vector of length |𝐴| corresponding to link disruptions in 
scenario 𝜔 ∈  𝐼 
𝑐𝑎: travel cost on link 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 
𝑑𝑠: demand amount of O-D pair 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 
𝑂(𝑠), 𝐷(𝑠): origin and destination nodes of 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 
𝑤𝑎(𝜔): capacity at link  𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 under scenario 𝜔 ∈  𝐼 
𝑀: big M notation 
𝐸𝜉: expectation across random events 𝜉 
𝑁𝑖(+): set of links inbound to node 𝑖 
𝑁𝑖(−): set of links outbound from node 𝑖 
𝑝𝑘: probability of discrete scenario 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 occurring 
Decision variables 
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𝑥𝑎
𝑠: flow on link 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 for OD pair 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 
𝑒𝑎: capacity allocated to link 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 for operator 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 
𝑔𝑎: capacity contributed from link 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 by operator 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 
𝑏𝑓: capacity contributed by operator 𝑓 to the pool 
 
Following the above notation, the formulation of the two-stage stochastic programming problem 
is shown in Eqs. (1) – (9). Eqs. (1) – (2) comprise the first-stage problem and (3) – (9) provide the 
formulation of the second-stage problem.  
 
Φ(𝐹) = min
𝑏
𝐸𝜉𝑄(𝑏
𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔))  (1) 
subject to   
𝑏 ≥ 0  (2) 
where   
𝑄(𝑏𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔)) ≔ min
𝑥
∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑎𝑥𝑎
𝑠
𝑎∈𝐴𝑠∈𝑆
  
(3) 
 
Subject to   
∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑠
𝑎∈𝑁𝑖(+)
− ∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑠
𝑎∈𝑁𝑖(−)
= {
𝑑𝑠             𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑂(𝑠)
−𝑑𝑠         𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝐷(𝑠)
0              otherwise
  ∀𝑖, 𝑠 (4) 
∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑠
𝑠∈𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝑎(𝜔) + 𝑒𝑎 − 𝑔𝑎  ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 (5) 
∑ 𝑒𝑎𝑎∈𝐴𝑓 ≤ ∑ 𝑏𝑓′𝑓′∈𝐹\{𝑓}   ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 (6) 
∑ 𝑔𝑎𝑔∈𝐴𝑓 = 𝑏𝑓  ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 (7) 
𝑥𝑎
𝑠 ≥ 0 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 (8) 
𝑒𝑎, 𝑔𝑎 ≥ 0 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 (9) 
 
The objective value (1) is the minimization of the total expected flow costs over a random 
disruption event 𝜉. The function Q is a recourse function or expected second-stage value function. 
Φ(𝐹) represents the cost achieved through the horizontal collaboration of all network operators 
denoted by the set F. Eq. (2) imposes non-negativity constraints on first-stage capacity 
commitments 𝑏. The second-stage objective (3) is the minimization of total flow costs for a 
realization of  𝜉(𝜔), where 𝜔 ∈  𝐼. Constraint (4) expresses the flow conservation constraints for 
the second-stage problem. Constraint (5) denotes the link capacity 𝑤𝑎(𝜔) for a realization 𝜔 where 
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𝑤𝑎(𝜔) = 0 if 𝜉𝑎(𝜔) = 1, which can be expanded using excess capacity 𝑒 or removed from the 
current link to lend to other links using contributed capacity 𝑔. Constraint (6) provides an upper 
bound on resource available for each operator. Operators have no incentive to borrow from their 
own committed capacity by design. Constraint (7) is a balance condition that requires pool 
contributions to originate from operators link capacities. Finally, constraints (8) – (9) enforce non-
negativity for all second-stage decision variables. The objective value without any pooling minus 
Eq. (1) indicates the cost savings which translate to the value of the coalition, which is used for 
determining the stability of the contract agreement.  
The computational complexity of solving a multicommodity flow problem on a directed graph 
as a linear program has a complexity of 𝑂(𝑛4), where 𝑛 is the number of nodes. When considering 
disruption probabilities for each of 𝑚 links, the computational complexity increases to 𝑂(2𝑚𝑛4). 
 
3.2 Solution methods 
The problem grows in size very quickly. For example, a network with four independent link 
disruption events would have 24 = 64 scenarios, while 10 links would have 1024 scenarios. We 
investigate three solution methods for the proposed model in Eq. (1) – (9). First, we provide a brief 
overview of the deterministic equivalent problem (DEP) that provides an equivalent to the two-
stage stochastic model in the form of a LP formulation (section 3.2.1). Second, we design an L-
shaped method to solve the DEP using decomposition (section 3.2.2). The method uses sub-
problems to generate feasibility and optimality constraints until it converges to the optimum. Both 
methods require scenario enumeration which can be very computationally costly. We investigate 
using sample average approximation method (SAA) based on Monte Carlo simulation (section 
3.2.3) to focus on a restricted scenario set. The SAA does not require scenario enumeration and is 
appropriate for large network instances.  
 
3.2.1 Deterministic Equivalent Problem (DEP) 
The deterministic equivalent problem (DEP) associated with Eqs. (1) – (9) can be formulated 
when the outcome space 𝐼 is modeled with a discrete set of scenarios 𝐾 with probabilities 𝑝𝑘 
associated with each discrete scenario 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾. Given a number of finite scenarios 𝑘 = 1,2, … , |𝐾| 
the expected second-stage value function can be expressed as the linear weighted expectation of 
independent scenario outcomes: 
 
𝐸𝜉𝑄(𝑏
𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔)) = ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑐
𝑇𝑥
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (10) 
 
Eq. (10.1) represents the total expectation over a finite number of scenarios 𝐾. The second-stage 
decision variables are expanded into the scenario dimension. The complete formulation of the DEP 
is included in the Appendix. 
 
3.2.2 The L-shaped method  
The DEP can be solved using a decomposition method commonly known as the L-shaped 
method because of the block structure of 𝐾 independent scenarios. This decomposition method 
was introduced by Van Slyke and Wets (1969) to solve linear stochastic programs and was shown 
to greatly reduce computational efforts required to generate a solution. An illustration of the block 
structure in a stochastic program is shown in Figure 1, where 𝐴 is the first stage constraints, and 
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the second stage constraints can be divided into a scenario dependent portion 𝑇𝑘, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, and an 
independent portion 𝑊. 
 
 
Figure 1. Block structure of the L-shaped method. (source: Hoppe, 2007) 
 
We provide a summary of the notation and the L-shaped algorithm.  
 
Algorithm Notation  
Parameters 
𝑙, 𝑧, 𝑚: feasibility cut, optimality cut and algorithm iteration step 
𝐷, 𝑑: Feasibility cut matrix coefficient and RHS bound vector 
𝑅, 𝑟: Optimality cut matrix coefficient and RHS bound vector 
𝑐𝑇: Second-stage cost vector  
𝑝𝑘: Probability of scenario 𝑘 
𝑊: scenario independent portion of second-stage problem coefficient matrix 
𝑇𝑘: scenario dependent portion of second-stage problem coefficient matrix 
ℎ𝑘: RHS bound vector of second-stage problem  
Decision variables 
𝜃: Approximation of the second-stage objective function 𝐸𝜉𝑄(𝑏
𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔)) 
𝑏: First-stage decision variable vector (capacity contributions) 
𝑣+, 𝑣− : Feasibility cut sub-problem decision variables 
𝑥: Second-stage decision variables  
𝜎𝑚: Lagrange multipliers obtained from sub-problem 𝐽𝑘 at iteration m  
𝜋𝑘
𝑚: Lagrange multipliers obtained from sub-problem 𝐽𝑘 at iteration m 
 
The method, shown in Algorithm 1, exploits the block structure of the DEP problem of the 
previous section 3.2.1 to solve the problem in an iterative manner. The master problem includes 
all first-stage decision variables and constraints (step 4). The second-stage objective 
𝐸𝜉𝑄(𝑏
𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔)) is substituted by the decision variable 𝜃. The algorithm adds optimality cuts (steps 
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10,11) to the master problem in order to approximate the value of the 𝐸𝜉𝑄(𝑏
𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔)). 
Convergence is achieved when the master problem solution 𝜃𝑚 reaches the optimality cut bound 
(step 13). In addition, the algorithm also adds feasibility cuts (steps 5-9) to the master problem to 
ensure that the produced solutions will also be feasible for the optimality cut sub-problem in step 
10.  
  
Algorithm 1. L-shaped method (source: Van Slyke and Wets (1969))   
1. Set 𝑙, 𝑧, 𝑚, 𝑑, 𝑟 = 0 and 𝐷, 𝑅 = 0|𝑏| 
2. 𝑚 = 𝑚 + 1 
3. If 𝑙 = 0: set 𝜃 = 0 and 𝜃𝑚 = −∞ 
4. Solve {min 𝐽 ≔ 𝜃 |𝐷𝑏 ≥ 𝑑, 𝑅𝑏 + 𝜃 ≥ 𝑟, 𝑏 ≥ 0, 𝜃 ∈ 𝑅} %Optimal solution is (𝑏𝑚 , 𝜃𝑚 ) 
5. For 𝑘 =  1,· · · , 𝐾:  
6.        Solve {𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐽𝑘 ≔ ∑ 𝑣𝑖
+ + 𝑣𝑖
−|ℎ𝑘|
𝑖=1  |𝑊𝑥 + 𝑣
+ − 𝑣− = ℎ𝑘 − 𝑇𝑘𝑏
𝑚, 𝑥, 𝑣+, 𝑣− ≥ 0}  
7.        If  𝐽𝑘 > 0 : 
8.                Add vector row (𝜎𝑚 )𝑇𝑇𝑘 to matrix 𝐷 and scalar (𝜎
𝑚 )𝑇ℎ𝑘 to vector 𝑑 
9.                Set: 𝑟 = 𝑟 + 1 and go to step 2 
10. For 𝑘 =  1,· · · , 𝐾:  
11.                Solve {𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝐽𝑘 ≔ 𝑐
𝑇𝑥 |𝑊𝑥 = ℎ𝑘 − 𝑇𝑘𝑏
𝑚, 𝑥 ≥ 0} 
12. Add vector row ∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝜋𝑘
𝑚)𝑇𝑇𝑘 to matrix 𝑅 and scalar ∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝜋𝑘
𝑚)𝑇ℎ𝑘 to vector 𝑟  
13. Set 𝑧 = 𝑧 + 1 and 𝐽𝑚 =   ∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝜋𝑘
𝑚)𝑇ℎ𝑘 − ∑ 𝑝𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝜋𝑘
𝑚)𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑏
𝑚  
14. If 𝜃𝑚 ≥ 𝐽𝑚: terminate else go to step 2 
 
Matrix 𝑊 corresponds to second-stage variable coefficients and 𝑇𝑘 to first-stage variable 
coefficients of Eqs. (4) – (9). 
 
3.2.3 Sample average approximation method (SAA)  
To further enhance the efficiency of the method, we consider Monte Carlo simulation to obtain 
a sample 𝐿 of the scenarios 𝐾, known as sample average approximation method (Shapiro and 
Phipott, 2007). This can be run in combination with L-shaped method (e.g. Miller-Hooks et al., 
2012) or with DEP. This method works best for cases where the total number of scenarios is very 
large or even infinite. We can generate a sample: 𝜉(1), . . . , 𝜉(𝐿) of 𝐿 replications where 𝑗 =
 1, . . . , 𝐿 from the random vector ξ. The sample mean is shown in Eq. (11).  
 
min
𝑏
{?̂?𝐿(𝑏) ≔
1
𝐿
∑ 𝑄(𝑏,
𝐿
𝑗=1
 𝜉(𝑗) )} (11) 
 
3.3 Cost allocation mechanisms used 
After determining the commitments of the operators, the stability of the coalition is determined 
using one of several alternative cost allocation mechanisms reviewed in Section 2. The equal-gains 
allocation mechanism requires computing the total savings. The total savings are calculated as: 
𝐶𝑆(𝑉) = Φ({∅}) − Φ(𝑉), where Φ(𝑉) is the objective value of (1) that is accompanied with 
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additional constraints as shown in Algorithm 2. Φ({∅}) reflects stand-alone operations where 
operators are not sharing resources. Then, the allocated payoff for each operator is the same and 
given by Eq. (12). 
 
𝑋𝑓
𝑒𝑞 =  
𝐶𝑆(𝑉)
|𝐹|
 (12) 
 
In the proportional cost allocation mechanism, the satisfaction  is given by the proportion 
contributed by each operator, i.e. Eq. (13). 
 
𝑋𝑓
𝑝𝑟
=
𝑏𝑓
∑ 𝑏𝑓𝑓∈𝐹
𝐶𝑆(𝑉) (13) 
 
As for the Shapley value, a value function needs to be computed. The values of each coalition 
subset in the contract design problem are computed using Algorithm 2 adapted from Shapley 
(1951) to our model. In step 2, we compute all sub-coalitions 𝑉 where the number of sub-coalitions 
is |𝐹|!. In steps (4) – (6) we iteratively solve the cost-savings resource pooling model of Eq. (1) – 
(9) |𝐹|! times to compute the potential savings for sub-coalition 𝑉 ∈  𝑉′. The constraint at step 5 
along with constraints (10) and (11) block players outside the coalition 𝑉 from using pooled 
resources.  
 
Algorithm 2. Calculate sub-coalition payoffs 
1. Begin 
2. Compute the set of all possible sub-coalitions 𝑉′ 
3. For sub-coalition  𝑉 ∈ 𝑉′* do:  
4.         For any operator f  ∄ V do: 
5.               Add constraint to the problem: 𝑏𝑓 , 𝑒𝑎, 𝑔𝑎 = 0 ∀ 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓  
6.         Φ(𝑉) ← solve problem (5.1) - (5.9)  
7. Compute subsidies under allocation rule 𝑋(𝑉) 
8. End.  
* |𝑉′| =  |𝐹|!, 0 ≤ |𝑉| ≤ |𝐹|  
  
Having computed the values, Eq. (14) is used to obtain the Shapley value. 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑓 =  ∑
(𝑉 − 1)! (𝐹 − 𝑉)!
𝑉!
[Φ(𝑉) − Φ(𝑉 − 𝑓) ]
𝑉⊂𝐹
  (14) 
 
This Shapley formula asserts that each player's total gain from a coalition structure is a 
weighted average of his contributions to all players in smaller coalition structures.  
The nucleolus also lies in the core if that exists (Schmeidler, 1969). The nucleolus is calculated 
by finding the imputations that minimize the maximum dissatisfaction. The excess of Eq. (15) 
represents the dissatisfaction for the coalition V:  
 
11 
 
𝑒(𝑋, 𝑉) = Φ(𝑉) − ∑ 𝑋𝑗
𝑗∈𝑉
   (15) 
 
Also, the core of a game is expressed as a set of imputations: ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑖∈𝑠 ≥ Φ(𝑉) . The 𝜏-value is 
expressed as the unique efficient payoff on interval [𝑚(𝑉), 𝑀(𝑉)] (Tijs, 2003). 𝑀(𝑉) is the 
marginal contribution allocation vector where each element 𝑀𝑖(𝑉) expresses the marginal 
contribution of player 𝑖 to the grand coalition:  
 
𝑀𝑖(𝑉) = Φ(𝐹) − Φ(F/{i})  (16) 
 
This vector is also called the set of Utopia payoffs. The minimum rights vector 𝑚(𝑉) is: 
 
𝑚𝑖(𝐹) = max
𝑉
(Φ(𝑉) − ∑ 𝑀𝑗(𝑉)𝑗∈𝑉\{𝑖} )  (17) 
 
The concept of the minimum rights vector is quite similar to the nucleolus but instead of 
minimizing dissatisfaction, 𝑚𝑖(𝑉) represents the least-amount that player 𝑖 can ask in the grand 
coaltion. 
 
 
4. Model verification tests 
 
We demonstrate model feasibility and performance using an illustrative example. We 
investigate the conditions under which operators will participate in a contract and discuss some 
key CGT concepts that provide meaningful insights. Finally, we report the results of several cost-
allocation methods and discuss some interesting findings.  
 
4.1. Illustrative example 
Consider the following network instance. Table 1 reports the O-D demand patterns for the 
illustrative example shown in Figure 2 and Table 2 lists out network parameters.  
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Let us now consider disruptive events that can potentially disrupt service on links 12 and 23. 
Figure 2 shows the probabilities of disruption assumed on the links with an 80% chance of failing 
completely, i.e. full link closure. These risk profiles may correspond to link-specific disruption 
events such as signal failure, demonstrations, traffic accidents or a tree falling. These independent 
probabilities are then used to calculate the scenario tree that enumerates all possible outcomes as 
described in Birge and Louveaux (2011).  
 
Table 1. O-D demand 
O-D Demand 
(1,2) 40 
(2,3) 60 
(1,4) 3 
(2,4) 10 
 
Table 2. Network characteristics 
From node To node Travel cost 
Capacity 
[𝒇𝟏, 𝒇𝟐, 𝒇𝟑] 
Failure prob 
[𝒇𝟏, 𝒇𝟐, 𝒇𝟑] 
1 2 2 [4,0,0] [0.8,0,0] 
2 1 2 [0,0,50] [0,0,0] 
1 3 7 [0,15,80] [0,0,0] 
3 1 7 [0,0,0] [0,0,0] 
1 4 10 [0,0,10] [0,0,0] 
4 1 10 [0,0,0] [0,0,0] 
2 3 3 [0,4,0] [0,0.8,0] 
3 2 3 [0,15,30] [0,0,0] 
2 4 4 [0,0,30] [0,0,0] 
4 2 4 [0,0,0] [0,0,0] 
3 4 3 [0,0,0] [0,0,0] 
4 3 3 [0,0,20] [0,0,0] 
 
Figure 2. Illustrative instance. 
1 2 
3 4 
80% 
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4.1.1. L-shaped method illustration 
We illustrate the single-cut L-shaped solution method in Algorithm 1. At iteration 1, set 𝜃1 =
−∞. No feasibility cuts need to be generated since 𝐽(𝑦, 𝑣+, 𝑣−) = 0 for all 1 ≤  𝑘 ≤  𝐾. At step 
3, 𝐽1 = 919.6 ≥ 𝜃1, so add the following optimality cut to the master problem:  
 
−2𝑏(1) +  8 𝑏(2) + 8 𝑏(3) + 𝜃 ≥  919.6 
 
At iteration 2: 𝐽(𝑦, 𝑣+, 𝑣−) = 4.0 for scenario 𝑘 = 2. Add feasibility cut to the master problem:  
 
𝑏(1) −  𝑏(2) +  𝑏(3) ≥ −34.0 
 
The algorithm generates a total of 13 optimality cuts and 8 feasibility cuts before it reaches 
the optimal objective value, 𝐸𝜉𝑄(𝑏
𝑇 , 𝜉(𝜔)) = 318. Table 3 illustrates the results of the resource 
pooling model obtained solving the L-shaped method. The results were verified by solving the 
deterministic equivalent program (DEP).  
 
Table 3. Results of capacity sharing model for small instance 
Flow Variables 
X[link, O-D pair, operator] 
Scenario  Pooled capacity 
(𝒃(𝟏), 𝒃(𝟐), 𝒃(𝟑)) 
Objective 
value #1 #2 #3 #4 
X[(1, 2), (1, 2), 1] 
40 40 40 40 
(0,30,73) 318 
X[(1, 2), (1, 4), 1] 
3 3 3 3 
X[(2, 3), (2, 3), 2] 
60 60 60 60 
X[(2, 4), (1, 4), 3] 3 3 3 3 
X[(2, 4), (2, 4), 3] 
10 10 10 10 
 
The results in Table 3 suggest the capacity contributions of (0,30,73) are needed to maintain 
optimal flows. Operator 𝑓3 contributes the largest amount of capacity to the pool while 𝑓1 does not 
contribute anything. Even if 𝑓1 does not contribute any resources, the operator improves the value 
of the objective by being able to use the pooled resources and thus provide more capacity to its’ 
users.  
 
4.1.2. Operator savings allocations 
We now employ Algorithm 2 to calculate the cost-savings for each coalitional structure in 
our illustrative example. The results are given in Table 4. We use the measure of synergy to 
evaluate the importance of a coalition. The synergy of a coalition 𝑉 is given by the ratio of savings 
divided by the total costs shown in Eq. (18). 
 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦(𝑉) =
𝐶𝑆(𝑉)
Φ(𝑉)
 (18) 
 
The measure of synergy is very important in understanding the effectiveness of each coalition. 
It can be a very useful tool for government agencies when deciding which transportation providers 
to invite to take part in the mobility contracts.   
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Table 4. Coalition results  
Coalition V 𝑽(𝒔) 𝑪𝑺(𝑽) Synergy(V) 
{∅} 919.6 0.0 0.00 
{1} 919.6 0.0 0.00 
{2} 919.6 0.0 0.00 
{3} 919.6 0.0 0.00 
{12} 679.6 240.0 0.35 
{13} 543.6 376.0 0.69 
{23} 621.2 298.4 0.48 
{123} 318.0 601.6 1.89 
 
Table 5 summarizes the results obtained under different allocation rules for the coalition of 
three operators {123}. While there is no ubiquitous “appropriate” allocation method, we consider 
the Shapley value to be an adequate indicator for resource pooling problems. Different allocation 
rules will distribute subsidy amounts differently to operators conforming to the criteria that are set 
by each allocation rule 𝑋(𝑉). Computations were performed in TUGlab (Calvo and Rodriguez, 
2006) and MatTU Games (Meinhardt, 2020). 
 
Table 5. Comparison of different allocation mechanisms  
Allocation 
rule  
Operator 
Equal 
Satisfaction 
Proportional 
contribution 
Shapley 
value 
Core  
center 
Nucleolus 𝜏 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 Utopia 
1 200.53 0.00 203.73 203.15 206.93 199.36 303.20 
2 200.53 175.22 164.93 136.90 129.33 144.48 225.60 
3 200.53 426.38 232.93 261.55 265.33 257.76 361.60 
*subsidy amounts are given in terms of travel cost savings 
 
The game presented in this section is non-convex (supermodularity condition is violated) but 
superadditive and thus all CGT methods listed in Table 5 are core allocations that maintain stability 
of the capacity sharing agreement. For example, if the operators agree to a cost allocation of the 
benefits based on the amount of resources that each operator contributes (proportional 
contribution), then the allocation vector does not belong in the core. This method is especially 
unreliable since cost-savings model solutions may not be unique.  
Figure 3 depicts the core of the game. Every payoff vector that lies in the core (dark polygon) 
is considered a fair and stable solution. The set of core points that also lie in the left-hand side of 
the large white triangle represent allocations where operator 2 receives no payoff but nevertheless 
are considered stable. For example, 𝑏𝑇 = (0,0,207) is also an optimal solution to the problem (1)-
(9) but the proportional contribution allocation is significantly different: (0,0,601.6) than Table 5.  
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Figure 3. The core of the game (dark grey area) and allocation methods of table 5: the core center (white cross), 
Nucleolus (green circle), 𝜏-value (blue diamond), Shapley value (cyan asterisk), equal satisfaction (yellow star), 
Utopia payoffs (red triangle) and proportional contribution (magenta square). 
 
4.2 Performance evaluation 
We compare the performance of all three solution methods: L-Shaped method and DEP with 
enumerated scenarios, and SAA-DEP (the sample sizes are noted in Table 7). The computational 
results are obtained using Gurobi 9.0 in Python 3.7.3 on a 13’’ MacBook Air laptop i-7 laptop with 
8GB RAM 1600MHZ-DDR3 and OS Catalina 10.15.4. To compare the performance of these 
solution methods we generate 6 random grid network instances. Table 6 provides a summary of 
parameters used to create these test instances. The instances can be found in Pantelidis (2020). 
 
Table 6. Random network parameters 
Parameter Value 
# of links 2(𝑁 − √𝑁) 
𝑤𝑖𝑗  Random INT[1, 𝑁/5 + 1] 
|𝐹| √𝑁 
𝑐𝑖𝑗  Random INT[0,100] 
# of scenarios 2√𝑁+4 
# of O-D pairs √𝑁 + 4 
𝑑𝑠 Random INT[0,100] 
𝑝𝑖𝑗  Random [0.6,1] 
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Link operators and vulnerable links are assigned randomly, and their respective values are 
drawn from formulas listed in Table 6. For each O-D pair an alternative path is generated to ensure 
that flow constraints are met. The results are summarized in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Algorithm performance results 
DEP  
runtime  
L-shaped  
runtime 
SAA  
runtime 
SAA Opt. 
Gap 
Sample size Nodes O-D pairs Scenarios 
7 sec 44 sec 2 sec 0.03 % 100 16 8 256 
19 sec 1.9 mins 2 sec 0.03 % 100 16 9 512 
2.6 mins 20.9 mins 27 sec 0.05 % 250 36 10 1024 
12.3 mins 47.4 mins 46 sec 0.02 % 250 36 11 2048 
2.3 hours 9.4 hours 2.4 mins 0.03 % 500 64 12 4096 
-* 13.7 hours 2 mins 0.05 % 500 64 13 8192 
* Solver out of memory 
 
The single-cut L-shaped algorithm becomes more efficient than the DEP once the number of 
scenarios grows sufficiently large. More scenarios cause a linear increase in the L-shaped runtime 
but an exponential increase in the DEP runtime. However, we should also mention that Python has 
difficulties handling a large number of iterations which justifies the large threshold (for 8192 or 
more scenarios) where the L-shaped algorithm becomes more efficient than the DEP. Overall, 
Gurobi solution times were very similar using different solving methods (simplex, dual simplex 
and Barrier method). The technological advances found in modern solvers (sparse matrices, multi-
threaded computing and pre-solve methods) have improved the solution times of large linear 
programs. The SAA proves to be adequate for such problems both in solution quality (less than 
0.1% optimality gap) and runtime. Based on the results reported in Table 7, the SAA can be solved 
quite efficiently alongside DEP when the sample size is sufficiently small. For very large sample 
sizes, the SAA can be solved instead using the L-shaped method. 
 
 
5. Randstad network case study  
 
We apply our modelling approach to design a contract between the operators of the public 
transport network of part of the Randstad Zuidvleugel region in the Netherlands (Figure 4). The 
Randstad Zuidvleugel is the southern ring of the Randstad and was used as a case study in Cats et 
al. (2016) to identify critical links and study disruption effects. The high demand intensity and the 
large number of multimodal routes imply that disruption costs will be significant for both travelers 
and operators. Yearly passenger disruption costs resulting from disruptions on one single light rail 
link in the case study network can exceed €900,000 (Cats et al., 2016).  For this reason, we identify 
a need for operators to hedge the disruption risks and insure the most critical routes. For the 
Randstad network, a large dataset is available for the period between January 2011-August 2013. 
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Figure 4. The Randstad network. Source: (Cats et al., 2016) 
 
5.1. Network operators 
During the analysis period, the case study network consists of six different types of services 
that are ultimately owned by four transportation entities: Dutch Railways (NS), HTM, RET and 
Connexxion (now EBS). Table 8 presents a summary of transportation services provided in the 
case study network and Figure 5 presents a GIS figure of the 4 operators’ networks generated from 
GTFS data. 
 
Table 8. Randstad network parameters 
Operators 
 
Parameters 
Dutch Railways HTM 
RET Connexion 
NS-I NS-L HTM HTMBuzz 
Capacity  
(𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎 × 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒔/ 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒓) 
4.75 2.50 107.25 23.2 32.76 6.48 
# of Failures (7-9AM) 
[min, average, max] 
[0,0.023,1] [0,0.027,2] [0,0.392,3] [0,0.128,2] [0,0.025,1] [0,0.011,1] 
Average link frequency 
(trips per hour) 
0.8 0.23 9.43 8.15 3.66 18.0 
Demand 
(𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎 × 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒔/𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒓) 
5.5 7.1 193.3 12.5 8.0 4.5 
Total network length 
(km) 
131.76 223.04 298.82 196.43 72.44 32 
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Figure 5. GIS map of the four operators for the case study from GTFS data. 
 
The network shown in Figure 5 includes two train services (NS-I, NS-L) that belong to the 
national railway company NS (Dutch Railways), the Hague-based HTM urban rail (tram and light 
rail) service that also owns an urban bus fleet that until 2019 operated under the HTM-Buzz flag, 
the Rotterdam-based RET that runs the metro/light rail service between Hague and Rotterdam and 
a fleet of buses. Finally, the international company Connexxion owned by Transdev owns a bus 
fleet that provides service between Delft and Zoetermeer. It is now EBS. 
Some of these transportation providers can be considered part of larger transportation agencies 
in terms of strategic planning and decision making. The intercity train service (NS-I) is operating 
between Leiden Central, The Hague, Rotterdam and Gouda. The local train service (NS-L) 
includes all local train services between the same stations. All train services are cordoned at Leiden 
Central / Gouda / Rotterdam Central. The NS (Dutch Railways) is responsible for operating both 
the intercity and local services in the case study area and are illustrated in Figure 4 (dashed and 
solid black lines). 
 
5.2. Network characteristics  
Within this area there is a high-density public transport network, consisting of train, metro, 
light rail, tram, regional and urban bus services that serve more than 400,000 commuters daily. An 
origin-destination matrix was approximated by a combination of empirical data (passenger counts, 
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smart card records), transport demand model estimations and for certain routes for which no 
information was available estimated based on the available capacity and assumed occupancy rates. 
Passenger demand and service supply correspond to the 2-hour AM peak period (7-9 a.m.). 
Link capacity is defined as the product of the crush capacity per public transport vehicle and the 
number of public transit trips within the AM period. We assume that links are unidirectional and 
travel costs are calculated according to average running time of link services.  
We compute coalition values, pool contributions and subsidies for the four operators present 
in the case study network. For this experiment we use the 80 highest-volume O-D pairs with a total 
demand amounting to 223,800 passengers/hour for the entire region. Some of these pairs have 
unique transit network paths to their destination which may be disrupted leading to infeasible 
solutions due to violating constraint (5). To account for that, we assume that these travelers can 
also use alternative modes of transportation such as carpooling, bike, taxi, etc. These alternatives 
are presented as additional un-capacitated direct-connection links for each network O-D pair. The 
cost of these links will be calculated as:  
 
𝑎𝑙𝑡. 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 10 × (𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ) 
 
Where the cost of shortest path is the minimum travel path of each pair in the Randstad transit 
network. Table 8 presents the basic parameters of the network that are used to run the computation 
experiments. We conduct 10000 randomized Bernoulli trials to estimate the average, minimum 
and maximum number of disruptions that may occur during the morning peak hours (7-9AM) by 
using the exposure time over the total operation time ratio. We can see that HTM is more 
vulnerable to disruptions which can be attributed to higher service frequencies. The demand in 
Table 8 represents the commuters’ willingness to use public transit services by identifying the 
least-cost route of each O-D pair. Total network capacity is 176.94 (1000 ×
𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠
ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟
).  
 
5.3. Disruption data 
The network disruption data reflect the disruption exposure by calculating the expected time 
that a link is exposed to disruptions per time period (𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 × 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) compared to the 
total time public transport services are provided on this same link. Based on this premise, failure 
probabilities are derived from the ratio: (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 / 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠). The 
network disruption data were obtained from Cats et al. (2016). The disruption log information was 
obtained from different service providers via an API. This data contained information about 
disruptions for a period of 2.5 years for the train network (NS-I, NS-L), and for a period up to 3 
months for the tram and bus networks. Note that disruption data is for databases dating back to 
2013. Since the network includes more than 1400 links, the number of scenarios is over 21400 and 
hence network disruption effects can only be captured by Algorithm 2.  
 
5.4. Results and analysis  
 In this section we present a summary of the computational results using SAA. The algorithm 
was coded in Python 3.7.3 using Gurobi 9.0. The capacity sharing model needs to be run for every 
sub-coalition, resulting in 4! iterations to obtain the total transportation costs for each. We limit 
the sample size of the problem to 𝑁 = 200 (6GB memory was required to solve each optimization 
run). To increase the robustness of our estimation, we ran the SAA five times for each subcoalition 
(5 × 4! optimization runs in total) to obtain the average to compute the cost savings of each 
coalition. The procedure runtime for all runs exceeded 20 hours. 
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5.4.1.  Coalition savings results for the baseline scenario 
Table 9 provides a summary of the results. Since each iteration is solved multiple times (5 
times), we report the average and standard deviation of the objective value. Cost-savings and 
synergy measures are computed using average values of V(s). 
 
Table 9. Savings (in million passenger-minutes) and Synergy 
Coalition s 
𝑽(𝒔) 
[𝒂𝒗𝒈, 𝒔𝒕𝒅 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟒] 
 
𝑪𝑺(𝒔) 
 
 
Synergy(s) 
 
{∅} [3.25 , 21] 0.0 0.00 
{1} [3.25 , 21] 0.0 0.00 
{2} [3.25 , 21] 0.0 0.00 
{3} [3.25 , 21] 0.0 0.00 
{4} [3.25 , 21] 0.0 0.00 
{12} [2.77 , 12] 0.479 0.173 
{13} [2.77 , 7.2] 0.480 0.173 
{14} [2.88 , 7.1] 0.373 0.129 
{23} [2.42 , 8.4] 0.830 0.343 
{24} [2.55 , 17] 0.702 0.275 
{34} [3.12 , 1.6] 0.129 0.041 
{123} [1.96 , 7.4] 1.294 0.660 
{124} [2.16 , 2.9] 1.096 0.507 
{134} [2.64 , 1.8] 0.608 0.230 
{234} [2.26 , 4.3] 0.993 0.439 
{1234} [1.81 , 4.9] 1.436 0.793 
 
As shown in Table 9, a capacity pooling contract can improve network performance by almost 
44% (𝐶𝑆 =  1.436) which is remarkable. The measure of synergy is indicative of the efficiency 
of a coalition. For example, the coalition {123} has a synergy measure of 0.660 which is very close 
to that of the grand coalition {1234} that has a synergy measure 0.793. This measure can be a very 
useful tool for decision-making and can assist government agencies in identifying critical operators 
that can benefit horizontal cooperation schemes significantly.  
After identifying these cost-savings coalitions, we report several cost-allocation methods that 
have desirable properties in terms of fairness and stability in Table 10. These values are reported 
in million passenger-minutes, which can then be monetarized by choosing an appropriate value of 
time parameter.  
 
Table 10. Cost allocations (in million passenger-minutes) 
Allocation rule  
Operator 
Shapley 
value 
Nucleolus 𝜏 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 Utopia 
Dutch Railways 0.333 0.372 0.370 0.443 
HTM 0.575 0.740 0.736 0.828 
RET 0.317 0.252 0.237 0.341 
Connexxion 0.212 0.072 0.094 0.142 
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Every allocation rule identifies HTM as the most critical operator in the network, followed by 
RET. As shown in Figure 5, HTM offers a highly versatile network with many redundant paths 
available. RET forms the main connection between Rotterdam and Den Haag. Those could be 
potential reasons for their bargaining power.  
The game is non-convex since supermodularity is violated (e.g. 𝑉(123) − 𝑉(12) >
𝑉(1234) − 𝑉(124)). The game core is illustrated in Figure 6 along with its four edges. Every 
subsidy allocation combination that lies inside the core represents a stable outcome. The core 
provides unique insights in determining the strength of each sub-coalition. The 4-dimensional core 
can be further broken down in 3-demensional surfaces. In that case the coalition {124} which 
corresponds to a resource pooling contract between Dutch Railways, HTM and Connexion is the 
most effective and stable agreement. This sort of analysis can provide important insights into 
setting strategic goals and designing insurance contracts. It also shows which players (or operators) 
can find a common ground more easily than others.    
 
 
 
Figure 6. Core results for the Randstad operators (baseline). 
5.4.2.  Coalition savings results with capacity reduction  
In this section, we assume a second scenario where HTM operates on capacities degraded by 
80% of the original in Table 8. The network parameters are given in Table 11, where the remaining 
20% capacities are highlighted in bold.  
Table 12 provides a summary of the results. The savings of the grand coalition are 40% of the 
total flow costs, compared to 44% in the base case. The capacity reduction for HTM accounts for 
59% of total network capacity reduction (from 176.94 to 72.58) but total costs are reduced only by 
1.5% (from 3.25 to 3.30 million passenger-minutes) implying that HTM does not contribute a great 
amount of resources to other operators. This observation conflicts with the fact that the company 
should receive the greatest amount of cost allocation to ensure a stable outcome.  
 
 
 
 
 
{1234} 
{123} {124} 
{134} {234} 
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Table 11. Randstad network parameters (capacity degradation) 
Operators 
 
Parameters 
Dutch Railways HTM 
RET Connexion 
NS-I NS-L HTM HTMBuzz 
Capacity  
(𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎 × 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒔
/ 𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒓) 
4.75 2.50 21.45 4.64 32.76 6.48 
# of Failures (7-9AM) 
[min, average, max] 
[0,0.023,1] [0,0.027,2] [0,0.392,3] [0,0.128,2] 
[0,0.025,
1] 
[0,0.011,1] 
Average link frequency 
(trips per hour) 
0.8 0.23 1.88 1.63 3.66 18.0 
Demand 
(𝟏𝟎𝟎𝟎 × 𝒑𝒂𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒈𝒆𝒓𝒔
/𝒉𝒐𝒖𝒓) 
5.5 7.1 193.3 12.5 8.0 4.5 
Total network length 
(km) 
131.76 223.04 298.82 196.43 72.44 32 
 
 
Table 12. Savings (in million passenger-minutes) and Synergy (capacity degradation). 
Coalition s 
𝑽(𝒔) 
[𝒂𝒗𝒈, 𝒔𝒕𝒅 × 𝟏𝟎−𝟒] 
 
𝑪𝑺(𝒔) 
 
 
Synergy(s) 
 
{∅} [3.30 , 7.6] 0.0 0.00 
{1} [3.30 , 7.6] 0.0 0.00 
{2} [3.30 , 7.6] 0.0 0.00 
{3} [3.30 , 7.6] 0.0 0.00 
{4} [3.30 , 7.6] 0.0 0.00 
{12} [2.83 , 8.8] 0.465 0.164 
{13} [2.82 , 7] 0.478 0.169 
{14} [2.93 , 10] 0.372 0.127 
{23} [2.59 , 120] 0.705 0.276 
{24} [2.95 , 9.8] 0.349 0.118 
{34} [3.17 , 9.8] 0.128 0.040 
{123} [2.14 , 6.1] 1.154 0.537 
{124} [2.61 , 5.3] 0.686 0.262 
{134} [2.69 , 0.2] 0.607 0.225 
{234} [2.43 , 2.1] 0.871 0.358 
{1234} [1.99 , 5.1] 1.304 0.653 
 
The reasoning behind a large cost allocation for HTM is due to its large demand. Since many 
travelers’ desire to use the HTM network for their itinerary, receiving capacity support from an 
insurance pool will improve passenger travel times.  
From Table 13 we can see that the amount of cost allocation that HTM should be getting is 
significantly lower than before. This means that they would agree to a much lower portion of the 
savings due to reduced capacity. For example, based on the Nucleolus allocation vector we can 
see that the subsidy amount is reduced by 35% (from 0.740 to 0.483 million passenger-minutes).  
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Table 13. Cost allocations under reduced capacity setting (in million passenger-minutes) 
Allocation rule  
Operator 
Shapley 
value 
Nucleolus 𝜏 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 Utopia 
Dutch Railways 0.323 0.362 0.345 0.433 
HTM 0.445 0.483 0.490 0.697 
RET 0.384 0.378 0.381 0.618 
Connexxion 0.151 0.079 0.087 0.149 
 
 The core also confirms that HTM has reduced bargaining power. For example, coalition {124} 
shown in Figure 7 is barely stable but also leads to increased bargaining power for other agencies 
(e.g. RET). Due to the reduced capacity, the second highest recipient of the cost allocation is 
shifted from Dutch Railways in the base setting (Table 10) to RET. This suggests that the reduced 
capacity from HTM is covered by RET which lends it more negotiating power in setting up the 
agreement.  In general, the capacity degradation of HTM impacts more the stability of allocations 
and less the total savings achieved through resource pooling.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Core results for the Randstad operators under reduced HTM capacity. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
With the emergence of a plethora of transportation services and the deregulation of traditional 
transport services, risk-pooling contracts will become vital in urban transit operations. New 
government policies should include subsidies as incentives for operators to share resources. In this 
study, we have shown that the benefits of such contracts can improve overall network performance 
by 44% and mitigate disruptions. A two-stage stochastic programming model was proposed in 
order to estimate transportation costs and the efficiency of three solution methods was evaluated. 
The performance results showed that the well-known L-Shaped method is suitable only for a large 
number of scenarios. Based on this observation, sample average approximation (SAA) was solved 
{1234} 
{123} {124} 
{134} {234} 
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with DEP in the numerical experiments since the chosen sample size was relatively small. In our 
model application, the SAA demonstrated sufficient cost-estimation robustness for the Randstad 
public transport network.  
In this study, we introduce the measure of synergy and the concept of the core as tools to 
evaluate the value and stability of potential contracts among operators. The subsidy allocation 
policies proposed are based in cooperative game theory and have desirable properties such as 
fairness and stability for games with non-empty core.  
There are several directions for future research. The current resource pooling formulation does 
not integrate subsidies into the pool contribution decisions. However, we are also looking into a 
closed-loop side-payment mechanism that addresses stability as an equilibrium concept. In this 
case no external subsidies will be needed to ensure contract stability. Instead, a side-payment 
mechanism between operators will be introduced to maintain the social optimum solution. There 
are also many other fields that this work can be applied to beyond urban transportation: freight, 
airlines, other two-sided markets, and other network flow games where resource pooling is critical 
to face demand/supply uncertainty.  
 
 
APPENDIX: Deterministic Equivalent Problem (DEP) formulation 
 
 
min
𝑏
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝑐𝑎𝑥𝑎
𝑠𝑘
𝑎∈𝐴𝑘∈𝐾𝑠∈𝑆
  
(A1) 
 
Subject to   
∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑠𝑘
𝑎∈𝑁𝑖(+)
− ∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑠𝑘
𝑎∈𝑁𝑖(−)
= {
𝑑𝑠            𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑂(𝑠)
−𝑑𝑠         𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝐷(𝑠)
0              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   ∀𝑖, 𝑠, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (A2) 
∑ 𝑥𝑎
𝑠𝑘
𝑠∈𝑆 ≤ 𝑤𝑎
𝑘 + 𝑒𝑎
𝑘 − 𝑔𝑎
𝑘    ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (A3) 
∑ 𝑒𝑎
𝑘
𝑎∈𝐴𝑓 ≤ ∑ 𝑏𝑓′𝑓′∈𝐹\{𝑓}   ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (A4) 
∑ 𝑔𝑎
𝑘
𝑎∈𝐴 = 𝑏𝑓  ∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (A5) 
𝑏𝑓 ≥ 0 ∀𝑓 (A6) 
𝑥𝑎
𝑠𝑘 ≥ 0 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (A7) 
𝑒𝑎
𝑘 , 𝑔𝑎
𝑘 ≥ 0 ∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝑓 , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 (A8) 
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